Issue link: https://iconnect007.uberflip.com/i/1440051
JANUARY 2022 I SMT007 MAGAZINE 31 built, the rules adapt, reducing the time, effort, and cost needed for routine inspections. Man- ufacturing benefits greatly from the reduced cost, effort, lead-time, and scrap, while suppli- ers take more responsibility. Counterfeit ma- terial ingress changes all that. Cost savings are eliminated as increased inspection is required to find cases and evolving strategies of coun- terfeit materials. Who knew that the counter- feiters would also take notice of inspection re- gimes and use that information against us? Reels of SMT materials on a feeder have been found, for example, that start with 200 genu- ine components, then, every seventh piece is counterfeit. Someone just increased their in- ventory by around 15%, in a way that defeats most incoming inspection procedures, and causes enough confusion within manufactur- ing that the source of the ingress could not be traced. e defense industry has an extreme solu- tion. Buying direct from the manufacturer, with direct secure shipping to the point of use, eliminates opportunities where counterfeit materials can be introduced. But, actually, the risk is only reduced. ere are still those vul- nerable people in the warehouses and driving the trucks. We have seen extreme cases where armed escorts for certain materials are provid- ed door to door, all adding significant expense, and yet still not addressing the root cause of the problem. The Cost of Trust: Digital Inspection If the physical supply chain itself can be se- cured during all transport events, there should be no need for physical inspection. Tamper- evident packaging and identification exists, with many technology options available. If you can trust the packing and unpacking stages, then all should be well, no matter what path the packages may have taken. ey could even have been bought by one company as a "ma- terial insurance," to be sold back into the sup- ply chain "grey" market. e IPC-1782A Se- cure Supply Chain standard explains exactly how this can be done, and means that for un- opened packages, value of materials can be re- tained, and risk of counterfeit eliminated. If packages are opened, then a clear responsibil- ity for the repackaged and secured contents is re-assigned, and the buyer can take their choice. is standard is based on immutable IDs of packaging and/or individual materials, working as a digital fingerprint that cannot be copied or cloned. Information associated with each ID is stored on a secure server, and is it- self made tamper-evident, using blockchain technology. e combination of physical and digital tam- per-evidence, as built into the IPC-1782A standard, provides an interoperable and effec- tive mechanism that allows the early detec- tion of counterfeits, complementing any phys- ical material testing. It also, crucially, provides the ability to know the exact responsibility for the source of each counterfeit ingress event. e weakness in the supply chain is identified, procedures put into place to eliminate a re- peat, and there is a good chance that enough evidence can be found to identify the criminal party. Not a good day to be in the counterfeit- ing business, which is what we want. A new IPC standard, IPC-1783 Compo- nent Level Authentication (CLA), is under de- velopment, which takes this a step further by defining how immutable digital fingerprints for each key electronic component, PCB, sub- assembly, and module, as well as mechani- cal components, work together to provide If the physical supply chain itself can be secured during all transport events, there should be no need for physical inspection.