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68 SMT Magazine • March 2015 government examined this silent menace to gauge its depth in the supply chain. The results were staggering. Afterward, discussions with in- dustry leaders sought to develop an outline of how best to prevent the flow of suspect compo- nents into the supply chain. One of the items that came to light was the inadvertent impact toward fostering counterfeiting that the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) [3] contrib- uted to fraudulent component growth in avi- onics defense high-reliability products (ADHP) by permitting the use of commercially avail- able items for designated tasks performed. An- other admirable intent of FASA was to reduce program costs inherently imposed as a result of U.S. Military-standard (Mil-Std) requirements. Under the Mil-Std protocol, additional parts and processes were needed to satisfy inspection, testing and other sampling by third-party orga- nizations creating an additional layer within the supply chain and increasing the cost of required parts. MIL-STDs tended to lag behind continu- ously evolving technology, preventing their use on government contracts. This was changed to allow comparable, commercial parts to be ac- quired for military systems. By default, this at- tribute opened the door to anyone with access to the consumer market or an abundance of discarded parts. Counterfeiters quickly seized upon new market segments. Previously, where knock-off handbags were a lucrative revenue stream, now the counterfeit field grew to include the fol- lowing avenues: component sales to man- ufacturers, hard to find part support, and recycled parts along with assemblies or end user items; all of these came with signifi- cantly bigger returns. Couple these factors with a defense complex stable of aging op- erational systems and the market was ripe for exploitation. With systems decades-old and original manufacturers no longer in- terested in making products for such a lim- ited market, the opportunities for counter- feiting were abundant. In reaction to this niche market, many in the semi-conductor industry sold obsolescent or discontinued component product rights, manufacturing technology and know-how, which flooded the market with surplus hardware. Export manufacturing centers such as India, China and Africa, where mountains of trashed compo- nents and surplus builds sat in refuse piles, be- gan to recycle components back into the supply chain. Commercial and critical systems, medi- cal equipment, and mil/aero were and are sup- ported by this same supply stream. As the counterfeiting industry grew, govern- ment and business clashed on other points that would impact overall anti-counterfeit efforts. Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHs Di- rective 2002/95/EC) in Europe fought against a rising tide of hazardous materials showing up in many electric products. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), a U.S. effort started in the mid-1990s, initiated the tremen- dous job of convincing the construction indus- try, from design to property management, to be environmentally responsible and use resources more efficiently. Meanwhile, International Or- ganization of Standardization (ISO) and AS 9000 standards coalesced various corporate quality management programs into a cohesive standard. These efforts helped to shape focus upon the world's limited resources, its sensitive environmental conditions and quality manage- ment issues. a SUmmarY OF cOUnTErFEIT avOIDancE: DEvELOPmEnT & ImPacT continues kraMer on CounterFeIts