Issue link: https://iconnect007.uberflip.com/i/1275152
24 SMT007 MAGAZINE I AUGUST 2020 fies, without doubt, the incoming package of that material. The external traceability takes over to show exactly where and who in the supply chain had responsibility over the pack- age contents. Since it is known that such responsibility will be tracked, each party will be seriously motivated to ensure that nothing was com- promised under their control. Driving respon- sibility up the supply chain means that it's increasingly difficult to counterfeit compo- nents. The effort to identify packages—foren- sically opening, replacing content, and closing the package without evidence of tampering— the inability to alter logistics records to divert suspicion and the knowledge that the respon- sible entity will be identified all go together to eliminate the ingress of counterfeit materials in the supply chain. Distributors could open and process the con- tents of packages, as they have the assurance of provenance to that point, and take respon- sibility for the content. Whether they are split- ting materials out for distribution, performing test or inspection, and then they create new secure packages. This can include materials that would have been classed as being "gray market," if the provenance showed that the materials had been owned only by a responsi- ble party, who is also now part of the respon- sibility. Trusted material consumers can now resell unused materials to another customer because the responsibility in the provenance is tracked and preserved. Therefore, the DFAR rules could potentially be altered and, at the same time, enhanced with the use of the secure supply chain, greatly reducing the cost of materials. There is a strong financial driver behind all of this. The additional cost is a cent on the dollar or less because this technology is already estab- lished, including the packaging, unique identi- fication, and tamper-evidence and blockchain solutions. All that is necessary is to follow the simple procedures outlined in the standard. In theory, there is a lot to look forward to as we see the complete elimination of counterfeit. The semiconductor industry could go one step further again. There is a mechanism data through the use of distributed technology, such as blockchain. Though this may indicate a small additional cost in the supply chain, there are potentially significant cost savings. Take the case of a U.S. military consumer. They are typically facing restrictions related to Defense Federal Acqui- sition Regulations (DFARs), which effectively means they can only buy directly from an orig- inal source, not a distributor. Such restriction is quite costly and also not as effective as they would like it to be. These materials still go onto a van, owned and operated by a third party. And what they don't realize is that the van may not be secure. They're paying a premium for material that can and is being targeted for coun- terfeiting. Such materials also cannot be resold into the market, as the secondhand nature of them would violate the DFAR rules—hence the smaller lot sizes being ordered—which contrib- utes to the higher pricing. With IPC-1782A, we set about creating a set of rules for how you should utilize and han- dle tamper-evident packaging with tamper-evi- dent labeling, along with storing the transac- tional and other information in an immutable way, using a distributed storage mechanism such as blockchain. Using this method, you can establish the exact chain of provenance for the material that you receive into the factory, and you can know for sure who is responsible for the content of that box. Putting the internal and external traceabil- ity together, a product such as a military drone can be made using this traceability. You can take any individual component, even if it is not uniquely identified—such as a simple ceramic capacitor—and the internal traceability identi- Though this may indicate a small additional cost in the supply chain, there are potentially significant cost savings.